

PRESERVING PROGRESS IN IRAQ, PART III: IRAQ'S POLICE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

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PRESERVING PROGRESS IN IRAQ, PART III: IRAQ'S POLICE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST
AND SOUTH ASIA,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 o'clock p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. CHABOT. The subcommittee will come to order. Good afternoon. I want to welcome my colleagues to this hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.

Before addressing the topic of today's hearing, I would like to say a few words about President Obama's recent announcement of a full withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011. For over 8 years, U.S. servicemen and women have labored in Iraq and sacrificed beyond our comprehension to achieve real, tangible gains. The mere fact that we today are discussing how to help Iraq improve the effectiveness of its police force is a testament to that fact.

Despite this, Iraq remains in a precarious position. It is painfully clear that although the Iraqi army has progressed remarkably from where it once was, Iraq is not yet prepared to defend itself from the threat posed by its nefarious neighbors: Iran and Syria. It is with this concern in mind that the U.S. and Iraq endeavored to negotiate an agreement which would maintain a small U.S. troop presence into 2012.

Public reports indicate that General Lloyd Austin, Commanding General of U.S. forces in Iraq, requested and recommended approximately 20,000 U.S. troops remain in Iraq. Unfortunately, these negotiations failed due to in my opinion mismanagement by this White House. Amazingly, the White House is now trying to tout the breakdown and lack of agreement as a success inasmuch as it has met a promise President Obama made as a candidate.

This blatant politicization calls into question the White House's entire effort to secure a troop extension. Fulfilling a campaign promise at the expense of American national security interests is, at best, strategic neglect and, at worst, downright irresponsible. And the White House tacitly admits this in negotiating an extension in the first place.

I fear, however, that our objective is no longer to ensure that Iraq is stable but merely to withdraw our forces by the end of this year in order to meet a political timeline. Saying that Iraq is "se-

cure, stable, and self-reliant,” as Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough recently did, does not make it so.

And to borrow a quote from then-Senator Clinton, it requires “the willing suspension of disbelief” to believe that withdrawing our forces from Iraq at a time when Iranian agents seek to harm at every turn our country and its allies advances our strategic interests.

Although I understand that Iraq is a sovereign country, I believe there is much more we could have done to secure a reasonable troop presence beyond the end of this year. Accordingly, I would like to again echo Senator Lieberman’s call to reopen negotiations with the Iraqis. It would be a failure of colossal proportions to withdraw our forces before Iraq is ready to stand on its own.

Today’s hearing is being called to evaluate the Department of State’s Iraq Police Development Program, the PDP, which has regrettably been plagued by mismanagement and poor planning since its inception.

A recent audit by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, SIGIR, raises a number of serious questions about the efficacy of this program. SIGIR’s audit paints a picture of a program which has been formulated without a clear understanding of or attention to the actual needs of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, MOI.

In a dooming interview conducted by SIGIR officials, Iraq’s Senior Deputy Minister of the Interior Adnan Al-Asadi rhetorically asked “What tangible benefit will Iraqis see from this police training program? With most of its money spent on lodging, security, and support, all the MOI gets is a little expertise, and that is if the program materializes. It has yet to start.”

More to the point, he suggested that the U.S. “take the program money and the overhead money and use it for something that can benefit the people of the United States because there will be very little benefit to the MOI from the \$1 billion.”

Although I appreciate Mr. Asadi’s sensitivity to the current fiscal climate, his statement makes very clear that the PDP as it exists today will not meet Iraq’s needs and has little, if any, Iraqi buy-in.

And although our witness here today may testify that the Iraqi MOI does, in fact, appreciate the value of the currently formulated PDP, the Government of Iraq has yet to sign a written agreement committing to the program or offer a single dollar to contribute to it.

I am also deeply concerned by the reports of obstruction and non-cooperation on the part of the Department of State during SIGIR’s audit. This is extremely distressing. And, to echo the sentiments of several of my colleagues in the other body which they recently expressed in a letter to Secretary of State Clinton, the Department of State is legally obliged to cooperate with SIGIR in the execution of its mission; jurisdictional games are unacceptable.

Although I have many concerns about the nature of the current PDP, I do not believe that a permutation of it is unimportant. The intent of this hearing is not to foreclose the idea. It is not the idea, but the implementation that worries me. Helping Iraq build an effective police capability is of paramount importance. The devil, as

they say, is in the details. And it is my hope that with proper planning, the U.S. can help Iraq develop a capable and accountable police force that serves its people's needs.

And I would now yield to the gentleman from New York, the distinguished ranking member of the committee, Mr. Ackerman, for 5 minutes.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chairman very much. Thank you for calling this very important oversight hearing.

I would like to welcome Brooke Darby, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, representing the State Department. And I am particularly pleased today that we are going to be hearing from Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi, who, with a team of true professionals, has been doing a tremendous job protecting the U.S. taxpayers' interests.

Our topic today is the Police Development Program, which Mr. Bowen and his team have been warning is heading for trouble for many, many months now. He has testified before other bodies in Congress. He has released written quarterly reports as well as specific audits. And the message is the same. The program for which Department of State officially took responsibility on October 1st is nearly a textbook case of why government procurement, in this case foreign assistance, doesn't buy what we think we are paying for, what we want, and why more money will make the problem worse.

Failed procurement is not a problem unique to the State Department. And when it comes to frittering away millions, Foggy Bottom is a rank amateur compared to the Department of Defense.

As our colleagues on the Armed Services Committee have learned, the best projects with the most desirable purposes can go horribly, horribly off track. And the hardest thing it seems that any bureaucracy can do is pull the plug on a failed initiative.

How do we know the Police Development Program is going off track? Very simple things demonstrate a strong likelihood of waste and mismanagement. Number one, does the Government of Iraq, whose personnel we intend to train, support the program? Interviews with senior Iraqi officials by the Special Inspector General show utter disdain for the program. When the Iraqis suggest that we take our money and do things, instead, that are good for the United States, I think that might be a clue.

Subsequent diplomatic intervention by the State Department with the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior may have changed their officially stated views, but I, for one, take the Iraqis' initial unfeigned contempt to be a more reliable indicator than their post-coaching enthusiasm.

So if the Iraqis are ambivalent, is the PDP program at least correctly structured to fill gaps in capabilities that have been clearly identified and assessed? The answer again is no. Despite being in development for years, as of today, the program's objectives remain a mushy bowl of vague platitudes.

There is no comprehensive and detailed plan for execution. There is no current assessment of Iraqi police force capability. And, perhaps more tellingly, there are no outcome-based metrics. This is a flashing red warning light.

Surely the bureau within the State Department that will be administering this \$887 million program is aware of these deficiencies and is moving swiftly to address them based on their long history of successful contract administration and robust management capabilities. Right? Well, not exactly.

The particular bureau at State that has inherited this mess from the Department of Defense is the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, known as INL. INL until 9/11 was informally known as the Drugs and Thugs Bureau, focusing chiefly on fighting drug trafficking and working to close the space available to international crime.

Suddenly, with the advent of the war on terror, INL was asked to administer hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts in two active theatres of war. Its performance has been subject to many audits and quarterly reviews by the Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan.

Pre-9/11, INL had no history with massive acquisition, large contract administration, or long-term program management on a large scale. It lacked trained personnel, management capacity, and was, frankly, overwhelmed. INL personnel have tried hard, but the results have often been poor.

Audit activity by the Special Inspector General on the PDP shows that the Bureau again is unprepared for the very large task they have been asked to handle. The warning klaxon is blaring.

The best indicator for any failed government acquisition, whether foreign aid or procurement of a new fighter-bomber, is incessant changes in program and funding requirements. As mentioned, the Police Development Program is already moving ahead without a strong buy-in from the Government of Iraq or a clear and well-defined plan of action, or clear measures of success. Not surprisingly, the funding levels, personnel requirements, and spending plans for the PDP have all been in flux from year to year. We should now be evacuating this building.

There is, of course, one more major sign of impending failure. As the last of our troops leave Iraq next month, yes, next month, as the President promised and as our Nation deserves, the interest of the United States Congress in Iraq is going drop like a tree in an empty forest. Not only will it plummet to Earth, it will do so without anyone even being aware it happened. A roughly \$900 million program without clear objectives, intended for a partner we will have forgotten, with requirements that change yearly and no genuine partner country buy-in, is no place I would be willing to put my money or that of my constituents.

Let's not wait for Mr. Bowen's next cringe-inducing audit. Let's pull the plug right now.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.

At this time if any of the members would like to make a 1-minute opening statement, we would be happy to call them in the order that they arrived. Mr. Marino, that would put you next if you would like to say anything. Okay. Mr. Higgins?

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes just briefly, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am very disturbed by what I read here. Given the amount of American investment in Iraq already. Since 2003, we have committed \$8 billion, \$8 billion to training Iraqi police, almost \$1 billion more for 2012.

The fact of the matter is when the surge was undertaken, it was designed to tamp down violence to give some breathing room for the Iraqis, Sunni, Shia, the Kurds to do political reconciliation and deal with all of those other existential issues, to keep that society from evolving.

Those issues still aren't resolved. And until those issues are resolved, you can't begin to think about developing a police force that people are going to recognize as legitimate.

In northern Ireland when we do peace between the Catholics and the Protestants, political reconciliation preceded the issue of policing. And so it was political reconciliation and a commitment to proceed. Then the all-important issue of policing was dealt with.

This is very disturbing and I don't think a good investment of U.S. tax dollars.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This whole episode in American history is a very disturbing thing to look at. And I think when people look back, they are going to wonder why the hell did we ever go into Iraq and there will be no question, even in our minds, they, whether or not the money that was expended and the lives and the blood that we have expended there was worth it. It was not.

And whatever we are spending now should be terminated. And as soon as we can get those troops out, the better. When you find yourself in a bad situation, you don't try to mess around and make it a little bit less bad. You just step over and try to get into a good situation somewhere else where you can accomplish things.

We have had some heroic efforts on the part of the people to make it work. And I think that, especially—we have Stuart Bowen, who has tried as Inspector General to make sure that the amount of proliferation and abuse of the American tax dollars was kept to a minimum. And he did his best. Our military forces did their best.

But it was an undoable job that we were trying to do for an ungrateful people. And if they don't have the gratitude for what we have done for them, we shouldn't spend a day more on a penny more on their behalf.

Thank you. Who cares about whether their police are good or not? Let them determine whether their police are good or not. And let them spend the money and make the commitment to do that themselves.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, is recognized if he would like to make a statement. If not, okay. We will go ahead and get to the witness, then.

Our witness today is Ms. Brooke Darby. Ms. Darby became a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, INL, U.S. State Department in March 2011.

Throughout her career in INL, she has been responsible for developing and managing peacekeeping and criminal justice capacity-building programs in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Africa, and most

recently Iraq. Before joining the State Department, Ms. Darby served on the National Security Council staff.

She graduated with honors from Mount Holyoke College, a B.A.; and Georgetown University Law Center, a J.D.

And we welcome you here, Ms. Darby. And, as you know, our witnesses receive 5 minutes, as do the members of the panel here in questioning the witnesses.

I would note that our clock system apparently is down, at least at your location there. So you won't have a light system to look at. So I will tap my gavel here when you have 1 minute to go and then a little bit louder or we have an electric shocking system if you would like. We won't utilize that. But I will do it a little bit louder. And if you could wrap up at that point, that would be good.

And so you are recognized for 5 minutes. Thank you for being here this afternoon.

Ms. DARBY. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF MS. BROOKE DARBY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. DARBY. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the Department of State's Police Development Program in Iraq. With your permission, I will summarize the prepared remarks which have been submitted for the record.

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which I help to lead, assumed the responsibility for police development in Iraq as of October 1st, 2011. Our program, known as the Police Development Program, or PDP, builds on the U.S. military's efforts with the Government of Iraq over the last 7 years.

The military's program utilized hundreds of police advisors to generate a police force from scratch and train it for counterinsurgency operations. Our much smaller cadre of senior police advisors work with Interior Ministry officials and police to help Iraq adopt its law enforcement institutions to deal effectively with today's complex threats, to develop structures and systems that operate with respect for the rule of law, and to establish systems and processes that promote and protect gender equality and human rights.

The Department of State launched the PDP on October 1st, 2011 and currently has 105 U.S. advisors leading the mentoring and advising mission in Iraq. Our advisors constitute the most senior and experienced team ever deployed by the United States Government with an average of 23 years of police service and extensive international policing experience. Each assesses Iraqi police strengths and challenges and works with their Iraqi counterparts on a peer-to-peer basis to develop appropriate solutions.

Since October 1st, PDP senior police advisors have held hundreds of meetings with Iraqi counterparts. At this early stage, most mentoring and advising needs pertain to management tasks required to run a police department, such as strategic planning, recruitment, logistics, and managing criminal investigations. The Iraqis have also expressed a keen interest in gender and human rights, for which we have a dedicated advisory team.

We are developing a rigorous program oversight plan to continuously assess our progress. In this vein, we appreciate the audit report released by the SIGIR on October 31st, 2011. I am pleased to say that we already are implementing the three recommendations SIGIR recommended for action.

To touch on the SIGIR recommendations briefly, first, we agree that we need a baseline assessment of Iraqi capabilities against which to measure progress. Our updated planning called for our senior police advisors to conduct that assessment.

Since October 1st, they have done just that. And we are compiling the results now. We will use the results to ensure that our performance metrics are clear and realistic for each program element.

Second, we will continue to adjust our police assistance program as planned based on real-time developments on the ground. A dedicated INL monitoring and evaluation staff will measure progress. And every 6 months, we will do a comprehensive program review to assess progress and to identify the need for course corrections. We will be able to keep this subcommittee informed as those developments and review processes occur.

And, lastly, we fully agree that Iraqi buy-in and ownership of this program is critical to its success. We at INL have the unique mission of trying to put ourselves out of business by offering programs that build sustainable capacities.

This program grew out of the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement that this subcommittee knows a great deal about. Iraqi officials then defined law enforcement needs and priorities. Our two governments continue to share the costs involved in police development in Iraq.

Our program will not pay for infrastructure, equipment, or operational support for Iraqi police. The Government of Iraq will fund these costs directly along with all personnel costs for Government of Iraq employees.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, we recognize the complexity and importance of this mission. And we and the Iraqi Government have committed to bilateral cooperation to help realize our common security goals.

Just today in Iraq, Vice President Biden and Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki chaired a session of the U.S.-Iraqi Higher Coordinating Committee, which recommenced our partnership. The United States is making good on this commitment by implementing the Police Development Program hand in hand with the Ministry of Interior.

Security issues remain a challenge in Iraq. However, the threat that would result from our failure to follow through on the investment the U.S. has already made and for which American servicemen and women, diplomats, and others have sacrificed their lives is even greater.

Iraq requires continued international support to remain on its path toward modern, professional, community-oriented police capable of responding to the difficult security conditions present in Iraq today. We absolutely expect that our mentoring and advising support for the Iraqi police service will enable Iraq's civilian police to

secure communities more quickly and allow democratic principles of government under the rule of law to take hold.

We appreciate your continued support. And I am pleased to answer your questions today and in the future. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Darby follows:]

**Testimony of
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State M. Brooke Darby before the
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
Hearing entitled, “Preserving Progress in Iraq, Part III:
Iraq’s Police Development Program”**

November 30, 2011

Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, and distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the Department of State’s Police Development Program in Iraq.

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), in which I serve as a Deputy Assistant Secretary, was charged with taking over from the U.S. military the responsibility for police development activities in Iraq as of October 1, 2011. Our program – known as the Police Development Program or P-D-P – builds on the significant investment and progress the U.S. military has made with the Government of Iraq over the last seven years. The military’s program utilized hundreds of police advisors, and focused largely on generating a police force from the ground up and training it for counterinsurgency operations. The Police Development Program builds on this foundation and draws on the experience and expertise the INL Bureau has developed in international police assistance over the last two decades.

Our much smaller cadre of senior police advisors and mentors, who work directly for the U.S. Government, are paired with senior Iraqi Interior Ministry and police officials to further develop Iraq’s law enforcement leadership and management capacities. The program also imparts specific advanced technical skills, such as management of crime scenes, forensics capabilities, and explosive ordinance disposal, which will be necessary for the sustainability and continued growth and professionalism of the Iraqi police services.

The PDP is designed to help Iraq build a modern, professional civilian police force that will assume internal policing functions from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. The PDP mentors Iraqi police leadership on how to regularize their engagement with the people they serve while protecting Iraq’s communities, its borders, and respect for human rights. Additionally, sustainable training programs will be developed with the Iraqis that are flexible enough to adapt to changing requirements. The PDP plays a critical role in developing a secure, stable and self-

reliant Iraq, as it builds upon the U.S. military's hard-won gains. The Iraqi Government has requested, and welcomes, this assistance.

Today's Program

The Department of State launched the Police Development Program on October 1, 2011 and currently has deployed 105 U.S. advisors leading PDP's mentoring and advising mission in Iraq, including 71 United States Government direct-hire Senior Police Advisors, 12 Department of Homeland Security advisors, and 22 hold-over Civilian Police Advisors who participated in the Department of Defense police program and are providing needed continuity in this transition period. Our advisors constitute the most senior and experienced police advisor team ever deployed by the United States Government. The Senior Police Advisors alone have an average 23 years of police service, eight years in senior police positions, and three years of international police development experience. Each Senior Police Advisor applied directly to the U.S. Government for this mission, willing to serve in the challenging security environment beside their Iraqi counterparts. And each Advisor was selected for his or her relevant and recent law enforcement experience and knowledge. Their unique skill sets and seniority allow them to create true peer-to-peer relationships with Iraqi Interior Ministry and police leaders, to assess their counterparts' strengths and challenges, and to suggest solutions to further advance the administration of Iraqi police services.

Since October 1, PDP senior police advisors have held hundreds of meetings with Iraqi counterparts, fostering positive work relationships and identifying specific projects and areas for mentoring and advice. A joint "Small Committee" of senior Embassy, PDP and Iraqi Interior Ministry (MOI) officials meets regularly to provide guidance and direction for PDP activities and efforts. At this early stage, the predominance of mentoring and advising requests fielded by the Senior Police Advisors pertain to higher order management tasks required to run a police department such as strategic planning, recruitment, logistics, and managing large-scale criminal investigations.

Let me offer a few examples of specific activities in which our advisors are engaged:

- At the MOI's request, PDP is already putting together a strategic plan on gender and human rights;
- In Basrah, PDP is already working with the Airport leadership to upgrade security procedures in compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulations; and

- In Erbil, advisors are already providing advanced forensic training at the crime lab there.

The PDP effort is a true whole-of-government partnership. DHS experts provide advanced training for Iraqi leadership in the MOI's Department of Border Enforcement in detecting document fraud, human trafficking, drug interdiction and smuggling. The FBI's Legal Attaché Office in Baghdad work with the PDP to implement several FBI-designed training courses aimed at helping Iraq's counter-terrorism components work together more effectively and collaboratively take on terrorism and organized crime matters.

Oversight is a Priority

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is absolutely committed to program performance and accountability, and we welcome input from the oversight community to identify measures that strengthen program management and transparency. In this vein, we appreciate the audit report on PDP released by Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction on October 31, 2011 and are implementing the three recommendations identified for action.

Specifically, we agree that a current assessment of the Iraqi MOI and police services is necessary to provide a starting point against which to measure progress. We also regard such an assessment as critical to enabling us to finalize our comprehensive PDP plan. Our updated planning called for our senior police advisors to conduct baseline assessments of existing Iraqi capabilities. I am pleased to report that since October 1, they have done just that. Our deployed advisors have submitted dozens of reviews, and we have a Washington-based team of experts analyzing their input to assemble a final assessment report. We will use the results of this review to refine and execute the future PDP programming, and ensure that our performance metrics are clear and realistic for each. Our advisors also have individual work plans that are tied to our program objectives and performance metrics.

We will continue to adjust our police assistance program, as planned, based on real-time developments on the ground assessed by the experts we have deployed. A dedicated INL monitoring and evaluation staff will measure PDP progress and every six months INL Headquarters, the Embassy, and our PDP leadership will perform a program review to assess progress and to make course

corrections, if needed. We look forward to an ongoing dialogue with the Congress about these issues.

We also agree that Iraqi buy-in and ownership of the program is critical to its success. The PDP grew out of the 2008 US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement, and later discussions with Iraqi officials on law enforcement needs and priorities. We continue to pursue a formal PDP implementing agreement as SIGIR suggested, but we are proceeding in coordination with the Government of Iraq, in the absence of a permanent Minister of Interior.

That said, the Ministry's commitment to the program is well established. Our two governments continue to share the costs involved with police development efforts. For example, the PDP will not pay for infrastructure, equipment, and operational support for Government of Iraq security entities, including the police. The Government of Iraq will fund these costs directly, along with all GOI personnel costs.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members, the State Department and our colleagues throughout the U.S. government recognize the complexity and the importance of the mission being undertaken by our Police Development Program. And both we and the Iraqi government have committed to bilateral cooperation to help realize our common security goals. Just today in Iraq, Vice President Biden and Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki chaired a session of the U.S.-Iraqi Higher Coordinating Committee, created under the 2008 US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement for long-term bilateral cooperation. More frequently, a committee of criminal justice experts from the U.S. and Iraq meet to discuss law enforcement and judicial cooperation, including the further integration and security of Iraqi police, courts and prisons, and to enhance law enforcement relationships that address corruption and transnational crimes. And the United States is making good on this commitment by implementing the Police Development Program.

The State Department does not underestimate the challenge of implementing this complex police assistance program in an environment that still presents great risks to our personnel. However, the threat that would result from our failure to follow through on the investment the U.S. has already made – and for which American servicemen and women, diplomats, and others have sacrificed their lives – is even greater. Iraq requires continued international support to remain on its path toward modern, professional, community-oriented police capable of

responding to the difficult security conditions present in Iraq today. We absolutely expect that our mentoring and advising support for the Iraqi police service today will enable Iraqis to secure communities more quickly and allow democratic principles of government under the rule of law to take hold.

We look forward to working closely with you to advance the goal of helping Iraq achieve and sustain lasting peace and stability. Thank you.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much for your testimony. And now the members will have 5 minutes. And I recognize myself for 5 minutes for that purpose.

The comments by Iraq's senior Deputy Minister of Interior, which I referenced in my opening remarks are I think you would agree very distressing. Governing, even more so today given the current fiscal climate, is about choosing.

And when viewed in the context of the extraordinary cost to this program, I am concerned that the currently formulated PDP will not meet Iraqi needs to a degree that justifies the expenditures.

The current plans, for example, involve an extremely expensive air wing, for which INL may not even be a priority user. According to the SIGIR audit of the \$200 million DoS requested for Fiscal Year 2011 fourth quarter, "Only about 12 percent of the funds are targeted to higher trained and deployed police advisers and managers. The remaining 88 percent are for life admission support for the advisers and staff, security for sites and transportation, and operation and maintenance of the helicopter air wing."

Would it not be a better use of taxpayer money to retune the plans to allow for more trainers in the field at any given time? And, additionally, how is INL working with the Iraqi MOI to better tailor the program to meet its needs?

Ms. DARBY. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Let me start by addressing the issue of Deputy Principal Minister of Interior Al-Asadi's comments with respect to the PDP. I cannot speak for Minister Al-Asadi.

Based on the comments I have seen attributed to him, I would say that he is frustrated by the high cost involved in the security and logistics and support for this program. And, frankly, I share that frustration. I wish we didn't have to spend so much of our program dollars in supporting the security and welfare of our people.

But if we are going to make the commitment to deploy our people to Iraq, we have a similar commitment to ensure their safety and their well-being. And at the moment, that is a very expensive endeavor.

And I think as a result of our continued engagement with Iraqi police, the Ministry of Interior and improving their capabilities, we hope to get to a point where they are in a better position to provide that security or system providing that security for us and costs will go down. But I can't project how quickly that will happen.

I can tell you that I was out in Iraq about 2 weeks ago. And I met with Deputy Minister Al-Asadi. And we discussed his comments. And he affirmed it to me that he very much supports the PDP. He welcomes the advice and guidance that it is going to provide.

He subsequently said the same thing to our police advisers at their headquarters in Baghdad, reemphasizing that Iraq needs the support of our advisers to guide and mentor what is a fairly young Iraqi police force, to professionalize it, to modernize it.

And his comments, frankly, echo the comments that our advisers are hearing. Our advisers have already begun to deploy and engage with their Iraqi counterparts. And the reception that they have received is very welcoming, very receptive. And in many cases we have even had Iraqi counterparts visit our advisers at our facilities.

I think that is a strong indication of the support that they have and the value that they see in the assistance that we were providing.

Mr. CHABOT. He didn't deny the comments, did he? He didn't deny the comments? He made the——

Ms. DARBY. He didn't directly deny the comments.

Mr. CHABOT. All right. SIGIR's PDP audit made three explicit recommendations, namely the completion of an adequate current assessment of the Iraqi police forces, and more comprehensive and detailed program plan, and a written agreement with the Government of Iraq ensuring its financial participation in agreement with the program's scope.

Has DoS followed through on these recommendations? And, if not, can we expect DoS to do so and when?

Ms. DARBY. Yes, sir. We are following through on those recommendations. And I would just like to say at the outset that we very much appreciate the insights and observations and recommendations of the audit community: SIGIR, GAO, our own Office of Inspector General. We take those comments very seriously. And we already have begun to implement the three recommendations that SIGIR has identified.

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you.

I think my time has expired or there's some weirdness happening with the clock here. I am going to go ahead and recognize the ranking member, then, for his 5 minutes.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am just a little bit dismayed with this whole thing. We are going to screw this up again, aren't we?

Ms. DARBY. Sir, I take my responsibility for U.S. taxpayer dollars very, very seriously. I also take our mission in Iraq very seriously.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Have we been getting our money's worth lately?

Ms. DARBY. Sir, this program is only 2 months in execution.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I mean in the——

Ms. DARBY. We have been monitoring it very closely to ensure that we do get results. And we have put in place a number of accountability measures to make sure that this program is carefully monitored and observed.

We have an Assistant Chief of Mission in Iraq, Ambassador Michele Sison, a two-time ambassador, who oversees the Iraq police program.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, when will they be ready to stand up without us?

Ms. DARBY. I wish I could answer that question.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Then why are we spending money if we don't have the answer? You know, this is turning into what happens after a bar mitzvah or a Jewish wedding. It is called a Jewish goodbye. Everybody keeps saying goodbye, but nobody leaves.

I am told there was this song during World War I called "We're Here Because We're Here," and the words were, "We're here because we're here because we're here because we're here. We're here because we're here." I think it just went on. There were no other words.

I mean, there has to be a time when we're no longer going to be there. And I don't know if \$100 billion, if \$900 million, if \$800 zillion makes that time come faster, or sooner, or what you get for

more money being there. So if we don't know how long it is going to take, I am going to stop paying the tuition when my kid's in his 19th year at college.

Give me some hope. Make up a year.

Ms. DARBY. Sir, I have been engaged in international police development for about 15 years.

Mr. ACKERMAN. 15 years. That is good. At \$900 million a year?

Ms. DARBY. The situation we face in Iraq is that for 25 years, for a generation, police in Iraq were instruments of repression. Respect for human rights, professionalism in discipline, gender rights had no place in policing in Iraq. Iraq needs our help to modernize and become a respected, effective police force.

Mr. ACKERMAN. And in your opening statement, you said they have shown an interest in that.

Ms. DARBY. They have, indeed, sir.

Mr. ACKERMAN. What does that mean, "They have shown an interest in that"?

Ms. DARBY. They are seeking out our help in developing plans to implement that in Iraq.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Can we send them a book?

Ms. DARBY. No. We actually have our advisers working right now at the Ministry of Interior's request on a strategic plan on human rights and gender issues and how to incorporate those into the Iraqi Government's administration.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is this a human rights and gender issue project, rather than the national security interest of the United States, to have them stand up to protect the world against whatever?

Ms. DARBY. That is also an element of the program, sir, but I think that having an Iraqi citizenry that goes to the police to resolve their disputes and has confidence that those police will act in a professional, respectful way that respects their human rights,—

Mr. ACKERMAN. What is Iraq—

Ms. DARBY [continuing]. Even if they don't turn to militias groups—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Okay. If that is what this is supposed to be, that is pretty admirable if we are flush. In the list of 190 countries in the world, where does Iraq stand in that human rights and gender issue? Are they in the middle? Are they in the bottom quarter? Are they in the top 10 percent of the best?

Ms. DARBY. I am in no position to offer that ranking. I don't have—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Why are we doing human rights and gender issues in Iraq and not Botswana?

Ms. DARBY. Iraq, and stability in Iraq and security in Iraq is very much in the U.S. national security interest. It is important to us to have a stable and secure partner in the region. It is important to us to have a partner on combating the types of complex threats we face as a—

Mr. ACKERMAN. How important is it in terms of dollars? Let's assume the rate is constant and it is \$900 million a year.

Ms. DARBY. Sir, we have already made an investment.

Mr. ACKERMAN. \$1 billion bucks a year for how many years?

Ms. DARBY. We have already made an investment of billions of dollars to date.

Mr. ACKERMAN. "We're here because we're here because we're here because we're here." We have already done it. So we are doing it again.

Ms. DARBY. Our program is very different from the U.S. military's program. The U.S. military had to focus primarily on generating a police force from the ground up.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is it possible this will take us 8 years?

Ms. DARBY. I am not prepared to put a time limit on it.

Mr. ACKERMAN. 4 years?

Ms. DARBY. But, sir, I will say that we will be reporting on progress.

Mr. ACKERMAN. We are spending taxpayers' dollars here at a rate of \$900 million a year if it remains constant.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's time has expired, but you can answer the question if you can answer the question.

Ms. DARBY. Yes. We will be assessing the progress.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I know when my time has expired.

Ms. DARBY. We will be assessing the progress that we and the Iraqis are making toward mutually agreed objectives and goals every 6 months. We will have a dedicated monitoring and evaluation staff who will be assessing it on a more regular basis.

We look forward to reporting to the committee, the subcommittee on what we have found as a result of these reviews and what it means for the program going forward. And we look forward to that dialogue with you.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. I apologize for subjecting you to my singing.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's apology is accepted.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, sir.

Good afternoon, and thank you for being here. Ms. Darby, your credentials are impeccable, and your work experience is beyond reproach. And I commend you. I don't know if you drew the short straw for coming in here and someone else just didn't want to do this, but my hat is off to you.

I am going to get very serious, right to the point. And you correct me if I am wrong. There are billions and billions of dollars missing in Iraq that the Iraqi Government cannot account for. Whether those funds are a mixture of U.S. and Iraqi or simply U.S. or Iraqi remains to be seen because we are not getting an answer. Maliki just doesn't want to answer questions, takes a position that he is offended when we ask questions like this.

I understand that this government, the Iraqi Government, implemented legislation that gave absolute immunity to the government officials for the loss of this money, knowing that it was stolen by someone or a group of individuals. They actually granted themselves immunity from criminal prosecution and civil prosecution for accounting for this money. And I understand that one particular individual made it quite clear that he actually walked away with \$9 million.

How can we continue to fund a government that works under that premise where they are granting their own corrupt govern-

ment officials immunity from prosecution from stealing, perhaps from the United States and certainly from the Iraqi people? Can you give me some insight on that, please?

Ms. DARBY. Congressman, I am sorry that that falls outside the gambit for which my bureau is responsible, which is police development and justice assistance. I do know we also work on some of the anti-corruption programs, and I can tell you that there have been a few positive developments.

I think there is still a way to go, certainly, in addressing corruption issues in Iraq, and we have been working with institutions that are designed to assist in that. But there was a positive step recently in that the Parliament enacted legislation that now prevents ministers from preventing the prosecution and investigation of their personnel for corruption. So I think we look at corruption in Iraq in incremental steps.

And with respect to missing dollars, I am afraid I can't answer that question directly, but—

Mr. MARINO. Well, I am not asking you to directly answer the missing dollars, where it is at. I mean, the government won't respond to it. So, you know, how would we know that?

But I was a prosecutor for 19 years at the state and Federal levels. I have a basic fundamental problem with trusting an entity or someone that I know is a crook and a thief and really has very little interest on appearance about what happens to the people of that country.

I would hope that the State Department also has that concern and also keeps that fact that we are not getting information from them, and there has been literally billions of dollars stolen and unaccounted for in the back of your mind when dealing with these people.

I thank you for your response.

Ms. DARBY. Could I just respond to that briefly?

Mr. MARINO. Please go ahead.

Ms. DARBY. Thank you very much for your comments.

I would just like to emphasize that none of the money that is associated with the Police Development Program goes to the Government of Iraq.

Mr. MARINO. I understand that.

Ms. DARBY. Thank you.

Mr. MARINO. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back his time.

Let's see—the gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins, I believe is next.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Police Development Program under the State Department is not more than 2 months old. Does this include a current status as to what shape the Iraqi police apparatus is in today? I mean, where are we at? And what is the baseline here?

Ms. DARBY. Our advisers right now—we began deploying our advisers this summer. And one of the first tasks we assigned to them was conducting a baseline assessment of Iraqi capabilities, which we view as essential to refining the objectives we have for this program and the performance metrics that we establish for this program and against which we will measure and evaluate progress.

This was an issue that was discussed in the SIGIR report as one of the recommendations of the SIGIR report. I came into this job in May, and I certainly wish that we had had an assessment that was completed before we launched the PDP.

Mr. HIGGINS. Right.

Ms. DARBY. There was an effort. We did issue a grant to an outside entity to conduct such a baseline assessment. And for a variety of reasons, they were unable to do so. By the time that became apparent, we already had our—

Mr. HIGGINS. Claiming back my time, why weren't they able to do so? I mean, that is pretty important here.

Ms. DARBY. I am sorry?

Mr. HIGGINS. Why weren't they able to do what they were asked to do?

Ms. DARBY. I think it largely had to do with the difficulty of moving around in Iraq and the length of time it took to get appointments with the Iraqi.

Mr. HIGGINS. So lack of cooperation?

Ms. DARBY. I think it was also some logistical and security issues that made it hard for them to get around.

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. I mean, what is the sense of things? I mean, is it a country that has a police force that is, you know, functioning in certain places, like Baghdad, not in Ramadi? I mean, you know, what is the anecdotal assessment of the strength of the Iraqi police force today?

Ms. DARBY. I will be able to answer that question a lot better in about a month's time, when we have completed our full review of the assessments that our advisers have done. But I would say in general that there is a sense that in terms of very basic police skills, the U.S. military has done an excellent job in working with the Iraqis over the course of the last 7 years to generate a police force from scratch and attain a basic level of capability.

Mr. HIGGINS. What is that basic level of capability?

Ms. DARBY. They can basically police. They can provide presence on the streets. They can take complaints.

Mr. HIGGINS. Do they have the confidence of the people on the streets?

Ms. DARBY. I think it is a very mixed bag, and I think that is why we are working as part of this program to build. That is actually one of the major subject areas of the program, is to build relationships between the Iraqi police and the community they serve and also to develop accountability mechanisms within the Iraqi police. And this is an area where they acknowledge that they need help.

They need a code of conduct for their police. They need a discipline system that works. They need to be able to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that they have taken action against police officers who have not performed their jobs and who have, you know, committed crimes or committed human rights abuses.

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, but those things are pretty fundamental, whether you are policing in Baghdad or Buffalo.

Ms. DARBY. Absolutely.

Mr. HIGGINS. Others have touched on this as well. You know, since 2003, we have spent \$8 billion training the Iraqi police, ap-

proximately \$1 billion a year. The Inspector General's review indicates that about 12 percent of that was spent for actually training police and 88 percent for overhead costs, including paying for security contractors.

You know, we have spent \$63 billion in reconstructing Iraq. We are scheduled to leave there at the end of the year. The past performance doesn't inspire great confidence in the ability of anybody in changing fundamentally the situation in Iraq.

Give me some words of encouragement as to what has changed on the ground. You know, I think that is very important here.

Ms. DARBY. I think we are entering a new day. I think what the U.S. military was able to do with Iraq was some of the basics. But the basics are not enough to sustain an effective, respected, professional police force. They need a lot of advanced and specialized training. They need systems and structures that will enable them to be a sustainable force, everything from disciplinary systems to be able to handle their logistics, to be able to handle their budgeting, making sure that their forces in the field have—

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes.

Ms. DARBY [continuing]. The equipment that they need to be basically responsible.

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. Let me just claim back because I think I am out of time. But I just wanted a final comment. All of this would be comforting and perhaps even confidence-inspiring if there hadn't been a past. But there is an immediate past that demonstrates pervasive corruption, a lack of confidence, a lack of discipline, a lack of a willingness to provide appropriate oversight to ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars are being spent in an appropriate manner.

So, I mean, again, you have been sent over here, and you are in a tough spot. I understand that. But this is a very steep hill to climb given the past performance here. And everything, you know, associated with Iraq, be it its reconstruction, its political reconciliation, all those existential issues that are fundamentally important to an evolving, functioning society are lacking.

And, you know, it doesn't give us a sense that, you know, there is a lot of opportunity here to see something dramatically different other than what we have already experienced. And what we have already experienced isn't good. It is not bad. It is awful. It is awful.

So I will yield back.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from California, who is also the chair of the Oversight and Investigations Committee of Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

And I have learned a lot today about Jewish weddings that I didn't know before. And it seems to me that Jewish weddings are much more fun than the Baptist weddings that I have been to, where they didn't drink and they didn't dance, and it was just getting rid of the kids, you know? So thank you for my friend, Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. Ackerman and I weren't always on good terms. I argued the case for supporting President Bush in his efforts in Iraq with Mr. Ackerman numerous times, and I was wrong. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. This has been a waste of our lives and our money.

Just the very program we are talking about, this isn't the first \$900 million that we have spent on trying to help them build their police. In fact, the Department of Defense has been spending money and trying to help them build their police since 2003. If my figures are correct, we have spent about \$7 billion by the Department of Defense, and they apparently have failed, perhaps for the same reasons that this program will fail, if you end up spending 12 percent on the actual training and 88 percent of the money that is being allocated is actually going to provide for the people who are supposed to do the training, you know, so that they can get along in that country.

Let me just say that I have in my life gone through several major upheavals such as this. And I got a very close look during the Vietnam War, and I was dismayed at that time. I remember going home from Hawaii—I was not in the military there. I was doing a part of a political operation in Vietnam, but I learned enough to know that we were going to lose. I mean, I just could see it.

I was 19 years old. You see gore and you see incompetence and you see corruption, all put in the same package, and it does affect an idealism of a 19-year-old. I will tell you that much.

And I hate to think what these young men and women that we have been sending over to Iraq are going to think when they come home and all the ones who know who they have lost. And for what? For a country that is run by a man who despises us: Mr. Maliki. People have no gratitude whatsoever for the bloodshed and the treasure that we have given them and provided them.

And, again, I am not sure that we could succeed in Vietnam or Iraq. You had better choose your fights. I think hopefully we will learn we have got to choose our fights in the future so that we are not wasting people's lives.

And, like I say, it has not been because we haven't had dedicated people. I mean, you know, Stuart Bowen has been in my office so many times trying to make sure that I know what was going on and the hard work that they have done. And he has had convictions and saved the taxpayers money.

But, you know, you can't do what is the undoable, and that is trying to run somebody else's country for them, when they have such dramatic differences in culture and in desires.

This police training program, that what you say—and, by the way, again, that figure of 12 percent training, that is not just for police training. I would like to suggest to my friends on the other side of the aisle who are much more open to the idea of benevolent and foreign aid to try to help others almost all the aid programs come down to that, come down to 12 percent going to what you really want it to go to. And 88 percent is going to make sure that the people there have drivers, great cars, wonderful accommodations. And, even with the NGOs, you will find them living in very fine houses and out in their SUVs and being taken care of like royalty in that country.

We need to make sure that we pick where we are going to be participating and helping. And we obviously have not learned our lesson yet in Iraq because you are asking us to spend another \$900 million. And I hope that someone is listening because I wasn't lis-

tening when I debated Mr. Ackerman years ago, and I should have been, on this.

So I won't ask you to comment on that, but I just thought I would throw that in.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. Will Mr. Ackerman have an opportunity to comment? [Laughter.]

I thank the gentleman for his remarks. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to congratulate my friend from California. It is a rare moment here in Capitol Hill that somebody says, "I should have been listening. I wish I had. And hat's off to" somebody else. I think that is to your credit, Mr. Rohrabacher, that you are willing to do that. And I thank you as a colleague. I wish more of us had the capacity to do that around here.

Madam Deputy Assistant Secretary, welcome. Is it your testimony here today that the State Department is fully committed to transparency and accountability with respect to any and all programs it has any oversight or responsibility for in Iraq?

Ms. DARBY. We take our responsibility for accountability and cooperation with all of the audit entities, with Congress very, very seriously.

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, ma'am. That was not my question. Is it your testimony that you are fully committed to transparency and accountability with respect to those responsibilities?

Ms. DARBY. We are absolutely committed to accountability.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Full transparency, full accountability?

Ms. DARBY. I am not sure how you define that.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I guess I am not sure why you avoid the word. That was my question, and you have ducked it three times. Are we or are we not? Is the State Department fully committed to transparency, full transparency and accountability, to the taxpayers of the United States and the people we are trying to serve in Iraq or not?

Ms. DARBY. We absolutely are accountable to the taxpayers, to our Congress, and to all of the oversight bodies who are looking into how we are spending our dollars, whether our programs are achieving success. We are absolutely—

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. I will sort of kind of take that as a commitment.

Are you familiar with the August correspondence between the legal adviser to the Department of State and the IG's office, SIGIR?

Ms. DARBY. I am.

Mr. CONNOLLY. You have reviewed the actual letters?

Ms. DARBY. I have.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Now, is it in your view consistent with that commitment, full commitment? It looks, frankly, to a layman, like myself, that, frankly, that the State Department is splitting hairs to avoid producing documents to SIGIR using the bureaucratic turf argument that this goes beyond your scope and, therefore, you are on our platform and we are not going to cooperate when you do

that, as opposed to let's see how we can work out a cooperative arrangement to make sure you have everything you need to get at the truth?

So given your commitment here today to full accountability and transparency, I would like you to respond to the observation that this correspondence doesn't look that way. It actually looks like the State Department is, you know, stonewalling.

Ms. DARBY. Congressman, thank you for that comment. I will say that, you know, as I have said already, we very much value the oversight bodies and the advice and guidance and recommendations that they provide to us and service to the American taxpayer and to the Congress.

The issue of coordination of requests from our oversight bodies; in particular, SIGIR, is not handled by my office. So I am not in the best position to comment on overall issues of jurisdiction and coordination. As you noted, our legal adviser's office is very much involved in that.

I do know, however, that there has been a series of meetings and dialogues between the Department and with SIGIR, in particular, to find ways to improve cooperation and coordination, including the appointment of a single point of contact. and the Deputy Chief Financial Officer, I believe, is the individual.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I have to reclaim my time, because, as you know, we have limits on time. But I appreciate your response. And I certainly appreciate the fact that, look, there are going to be turf issues. There are going to be differences of opinion. And I certainly welcome and I am sure SIGIR does as well your reiteration of the assurance that you are looking for ways to actually cooperate because this correspondence looks like a lawyer who is looking for ways not to cooperate and justify it legally. And I just mentioned that to you because it is not a reassuring set of correspondence, as far as I am concerned.

I want to ask you. The senior Deputy Minister of Interior, Adnan al-Asadi, referred to the PDP program and said it was a hopeless waste of money. Why would the Deputy Minister of Interior of a country we are trying to help say such a thing? And are those sentiments the State Department has heard from other senior officials of the Iraqi Government?

Ms. DARBY. I can't speak to what may have led Principal Deputy Interior Minister Al-Asadi to make those remarks. As I indicated before, I did ask him about those remarks when I was in Iraq about 2 weeks ago. And he reiterated Iraq's need for and interest in PDP and, in particular, the advising and mentoring that we are providing to Iraqi police. And he reiterated that point. He made a special trip over to our headquarters of our police program in Baghdad to reiterate that point to our advisers personally. And he indicated he had reviewed their CDs.

And I think that the interaction that our advisers have had with their senior Iraqi counterparts speaks volumes and the positive response they have received and the real desire and quest for more help, guidance, and assistance speaks well to the prospects for success for this program.

Mr. CONNOLLY. If the chairman would allow a very simple, direct follow-up?

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman is recognized for 1 additional minute.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair so much for his graciousness. So is it your testimony that you believe the PDP is, in fact, an efficacious program, it is working?

Mr. CHABOT. Sir, we are 2 months into the program. I am optimistic about its chances for success. And we have built in accountability and review measures so that we will be able to constantly monitor and assess whether we are having an impact, make corrections if we need to, and have an ongoing dialogue with the Congress about what success we are achieving and where we are not achieving it and the direction we see going forward.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, is recognized for 5 minutes. And following the gentleman from New York's questions, we will move to the second panel. The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

How has your day been going so far, Ms. Darby?

Ms. DARBY. Just great.

Mr. TURNER. Good. I am delighted. Maybe these will be easy ones.

In January, we will be leaving a lot of civilians there: Advisers, NGOs, et cetera. Are there any strings or contingencies built into these plans to protect our citizens from some of the eventualities that we are sure will be coming up? They will be attacked. They will be in self-defense. We will be seeking immunity. There will be kidnappings, et cetera, et cetera. Is this in the thinking and something we should perhaps put there if it isn't?

Ms. DARBY. Sir, I can only speak to the Police Development Program, not to all of our citizens in Iraq. And I think probably diplomatic security is in the best position to answer the details of your questions, but I will say that we obviously take the security of the personnel that we deploy to Iraq very, very seriously.

We are working very closely with a regional security officer, who is the lead for our Diplomatic Security Bureau, in the Country of Iraq to constantly monitor and assess the way that we operate the program to promote the greatest security for our personnel.

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman yields back his time.

We want to thank you very much, Ms. Darby, for your time here this afternoon. And we are going to move on to our second panel now. Thank you.

Ms. DARBY. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. CHABOT. As the two members of the second panel approach, I will go ahead and introduce them. First we have Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. Mr. Bowen was appointed Inspector General for the coalition, provisional authority, in January 2004 and has served as the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction since October 2004.

As the taxpayers' watchdog in Iraq, Mr. Bowen oversees more than \$63 billion in U.S. funds, including the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, the Iraq Security Forces Fund, the Economic Sup-

port Fund, international narcotics control and law enforcement funding, and the Commander's Emergency Response Program. Mr. Bowen's public service career includes service to President George W. Bush as Deputy Assistant to the President, Deputy Staff Secretary, Special Assistant to the President, and Associate Counsel.

He holds a B.A. from the University of the South and a J.D. from St. Mary's Law School.

And we welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. Bowen. Is Mr. Bowen here? Oh, okay.

And then our other panel member is Glenn D. Furbish. Mr. Glenn Furbish is the Senior Audit Manager in the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Mr. Furbish has served as a senior audit manager with the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction since May 2005.

Prior to this, Mr. Furbish spent 28 years with the U.S. Government Accountability Office as a senior program analyst for defense issues. And before that, Mr. Furbish spent 6 years in the U.S. Army as an infantry officer and a helicopter pilot.

He holds a B.S. from George Mason University in accounting.

We want to thank you especially for your service to our country there, Mr. Furbish.

And, Mr. Bowen, while you were gone, I said a whole lot of nice things about you. So if you are prepared, Mr. Bowen, we can go ahead and begin with you first. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MR. STUART W. BOWEN, JR., INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, ACCOMPANIED BY MR. GLENN D. FURBISH, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ackerman, members of the committee.

I am honored to be joined by Glenn Furbish, my Assistant Inspector General for Audit, who has served me faithfully for years, both here and in Iraq.

And on a personal point, I am also especially blessed that my mother is here this morning, too, in the audience.

Mr. CHABOT. Excellent.

Mr. BOWEN. So welcome her.

Today's hearing addresses a crucial issue, as the previous panel and questions identify. And that is, what is the proper expenditure of another \$1 billion in Iraq? And what will it accomplish? And that was the core purpose of our audit, which we began last April, struggled to execute through the spring and early summer, forcing me eventually to do something very unusual, send an obstruction letter to Secretary Clinton about the stonewalling that occurred in the course of the audit.

That had the effect of breaking the logjam and getting us enough information to produce the audit that we issued on October 24th. It addresses, really, more than \$1 billion in potential expenditures because the Congress has already approved and appropriated over 700 million. State has in its possession now between 200 and 300

million and has a pending request for 887 million. Do the math. That is more like \$1.2 billion.

The program just began about a month ago. And it is impossible to ascertain the nature of the progress thus far given its young state.

But I did visit with Ambassador Sison when I was in Iraq on my 31st trip 2 weeks ago. And she indicated to me that they embraced our recommendations from our audits. And we are implementing the assessment, as required.

And I met with Deputy Secretary Burns 2 days ago. And he, similarly, embraced both what we have had to say and the need to address the weaknesses.

The latest audit is just the latest in a series of audits we have been doing on police training since 2007. And they have echoed similar problems: Weak management controls, weak oversight. And, indeed, our audit of a year ago on this issue recommended that an assessment be done of the police forces in preparation for transition. It wasn't done. That, curiously, also echoed a recommendation from a joint planning team from 2 years ago that went to Iraq and said, "Well, we have got to get a baseline." It obviously, as we know, wasn't done.

All the things that we found in our audit were that there wasn't a sufficiently comprehensive and detailed plan on what the state intended to accomplish through the PDP; that there wasn't sufficient transparency in the budgeting; that the amount of funds that had been requested were probably more than what is now a scale-back program down from 192 trainers to 115 today; and that, as we have talked about, as the panel has discussed, Iraqi support was limited or even questionable.

We made three recommendations: Do the assessment again, develop a comprehensive plan that has metrics and milestones that demonstrate what is going to be accomplished, what goals are there;—the committee has already addressed that—and that we obtain, the State Department obtain, written assurances pursuant to existing regulations adopted by the Congress from Iraq on their contributions, certainly at least to that program money.

Currently, as we have heard, there are about 100 advisers on the ground over there. And they have got 200 to 300 million in the bank. They estimate the expense for the program is 500 million. You do the math. Eight hundred eighty-seven million may not be necessary for next year as you look at it.

But, as was also mentioned by the committee, this is a 5-year program. It is envisioned to carry on perhaps at, what, \$800 million to \$1 billion a year for 5 years. So we are not talking about one. We are talking about potentially \$5 billion.

Iraqi buy-in remains an issue. They haven't provided their contribution commitment. When I met with Deputy Minister Al-Asadi 2 weeks ago and asked him, you know, "Have you withdrawn from your comments that you made to us a month ago?" he said, "Well, they are still on my Web site. They are still posted." And he didn't indicate to me that he would step back, although he said, "We welcome the support."

And so, with that, you know, I think it is deserving of careful scrutiny. I think the committee is demonstrating that today.

And, with that, I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen follows:]

Statement of
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.,
Inspector General,
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
before the
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
United States House of Representatives
November 30, 2011

Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the United States' support to Iraq's fledgling democracy.

My testimony today focuses on the largest part of the continuing U.S. assistance effort in Iraq, the Police Development Program (PDP), which the Department of State (State) is implementing. Our recent audit of the PDP¹ was our 200th since the inception of my Office, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), over seven years ago. I am proud of the outstanding productivity, steady professionalism, and unfailing perseverance of my audit team on this and all of our audits.

I recently returned from my 31st trip to Iraq, during which I was briefed on the PDP by Ambassador Michele Sison, the senior State Department official in charge of the program. My testimony is informed by her comments on the PDP's recent progress.

Background

In April 2003, just after U.S. forces overwhelmed Iraq's armed forces and toppled Saddam Hussein's regime, about 4,000 poorly-trained police were patrolling the streets of Baghdad, trying to keep order among a populace of 7 million; but the city descended into chaos. This paltry complement of law enforcement personnel faced with an impossible mission was emblematic of the complete breakdown in Iraq's rule-of-law system in the spring of 2003. The consequences of this breakdown became quickly evident in the rampant looting that rapidly swamped the capital city.

In May 2003, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III acted to stave off societal collapse by ordering the creation of police training programs, which consisted of classes of 25-30 students in refurbished classrooms with U.S. military police instructors. This rudimentary start was buttressed by a the allocation of \$950 million from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to bolster Iraq's

¹ Iraqi Police Development Program: Opportunities for Improved Program Accountability and Budget Transparency (SIGIR 12-006, October 24, 2011)

police forces. By November 2003, the United States had opened a new police training center in Jordan, with the first class of 456 Iraqi cadets then undergoing an 8-week training course.²

As a matter of U.S. policy, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), with support from the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program, has the general duty to develop policies and programs that strengthen rule-of-law capacities outside of the United States. In Iraq, however, full control and responsibility for such programs was given to the Department of Defense (DoD), pursuant to National Security Policy Directive 36 (signed by President George W. Bush in May 2004).

The President took this significant decision to stabilize the faltering security situation in Iraq, to strengthen the expanding security training mission, and to provide for unity of command in this mission's execution. After the expiration of the Coalition Provisional Authority's mandate in June 2004, Ambassador John Negroponte, the newly-appointed Ambassador to Iraq, conducted a complete program review, shifting significant chunks of money from "bricks and mortar" projects to security programs, including police training. Support to the security sector significantly expanded in 2005, when the Congress created the Iraq Security Forces Fund, which has received about \$25 billion in appropriations since its inception. SIGIR estimates that, as of October 2011, the United States has spent about \$8 billion to staff, train, and equip Iraq's police forces.

Prior SIGIR Work On Police Training in Iraq

Several SIGIR audits previously examined U.S. programs to train the Iraqi police. Our latest report (released in October 2011)³ builds upon and, to some extent, echoes our earlier findings and observations. For example, in October 2010, we issued a report on DoD's management of the police training program, identifying a variety of weaknesses, the most salient of which was DoD's lack of a comprehensive strategy to shape and guide the program. Because of frequent personnel rotations – virtually no one stays on assignment in Iraq longer than a year – DoD needed a comprehensive plan to ensure program continuity. But the absence of such an overarching plan meant that program focus and goals changed frequently. Thus, instead of one seven-year police training program in Iraq, DoD ended up with seven one-year programs.

SIGIR's October 2010 report also concluded that, despite years of spending billions in taxpayer dollars on training, the overall capabilities of the Iraqi police forces were unknown. We found that the DoD program had focused on output-oriented factors, such as numbers trained, rather than outcome-oriented factors, such as skill levels achieved. Further, DoD had failed to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Iraqi police services. The few assessments DoD did conduct did not embrace the entire force. As a result, at the end of DoD's management of the program, it

² Hard Lessons, p.126

³ Iraqi Security Forces: Police Training Program Developed Sizeable Force, but Capabilities Are Unknown (SIGIR 11-003, October 25, 2010)

was unclear precisely what was accomplished -- from an outcome rather than an output perspective-- after an expenditure of about \$8 billion in U.S. taxpayer funds.

To address these problems, we made several recommendations in our October 2010 report. Specifically, we called upon the Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Iraq, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary for INL, to work with the Iraq Ministry of Interior to assess the capabilities of the Iraq police forces and to provide that assessment to INL. Although they agreed to the recommendation, this assessment was not accomplished, a shortfall which now burdens the PDP.

Our other work on police training uncovered a variety of management weaknesses, including the following:

- In 2007, SIGIR and State's Office of Inspector General found that INL and the State's Office of Acquisition Management had put millions of dollars at risk, and that property acquired under contract was missing. \$43.8 million was paid for a residential camp that was never used. State may have spent another \$36.4 million for weapons and equipment that it could not account for.⁴
- In another 2007 audit, we reported that INL's system for managing invoices and supporting documents submitted by DynCorp was in disarray. As a result, INL did not know specifically what it had received for most of the \$1.2 billion in expenditures under the DynCorp contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program.⁵
- In 2008, we reported that INL had made a concerted effort to implement recommendations made by SIGIR and State's Office of Inspector General in prior reports on the police training program and had developed a detailed project plan that included initiatives to improve contract management. SIGIR believed that, taken together, State was improving its overall contract administration in Iraq.⁶
- In 2010, we reported that INL continued to exhibit weak oversight of the DynCorp task orders for support of the Iraqi police training program. INL lacked sufficient resources and controls to manage the task orders. As a result, over \$2.5 billion in U.S. funds were vulnerable to waste and fraud. In-Country Contracting Officer Representatives had failed to perform adequate reviews and tests of DynCorp's invoices. We observed in this audit that, as State takes responsibility for the police training program from DoD in 2011, it

⁴ Review of DynCorp International, I.L.C., Contract Number S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task order 0338, For the Iraqi Police Training Program Support (SIGIR 06-029, January 30, 2007)(DoS/OIG Aud-OQO-07-020)

⁵ Interim Review of DynCorp International, I.L.C., Spending Under Its Contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program (SIGIR-07-016, October 23, 2007)

⁶ Progress on Recommended Improvements to Contract Administration for the Iraqi Police Training Program (SIGIR-08-014, April 22, 2008)

would be critical that it have in place effective contract management and controls to ensure that U.S. funds are effectively and efficiently spent.⁷

SIGIR's Current Report

In the summer of 2011, we revisited the police training issue to assess INL's efforts to take over the program. We examined program planning, costs, and the required contributions by the Government of Iraq.

Our report found that:

- 1) INL did not have a comprehensive and detailed plan on what it intends to accomplish through the PDP program;
- 2) INL's PDP budget lacked sufficient transparency and all requested funds may not be needed; and
- 3) Iraq support for the PDP was limited.

INL Lacks a Comprehensive and Detailed Plan for the PDP

INL spent more than two years preparing to take over police training from DoD. It developed a concept of operations for the PDP, but it did not produce (a) a detailed plan identifying what it planned to accomplish, (b) a comprehensive set of intermediate and longer-term milestones to judge progress, or (c) sufficient goals and metrics to assess program outcomes.

Burdening INL's approach was the lack of a current assessment of Iraqi police capabilities. In 2009, a Joint Transition Planning Team made a three-week visit to Iraq to gather a baseline understanding of the capabilities of Iraq's police forces. The team concluded that a number of follow-on steps would be required for effective program design, including a force assessment. But these follow-on steps were not fully accomplished, including, as noted, the much-needed force assessment.

Under the PDP concept of operations, the program tasks require INL advisory teams "to advise and mentor" Iraqi police. Mentoring and advising are vague concepts. If no specific goals for mentoring and advising are established, then outcomes will remain in the shadows.

Over the course of our audit, State provided us with a number of documents that described the PDP. In our review of them, we found that none of the documents contained the elements required of a comprehensive and detailed plan. Moreover, they were not based on a current police force capability assessment, and they did not include outcome-based metrics.

⁷ Long-standing Weaknesses in Department of State's Oversight of DynCorp Contract for Support of the Iraqi Police Training Program (SIGIR 10-008, January 25, 2010)

Actual Program Funding Needs Remain Uncertain

INL's current program will be limited to 115 advisors distributed among three hub locations; this is a decrease from the 192 advisors previously anticipated. INL reduced the number of training sites from 28 to 21. Because some operational and security costs are fixed, the reduction to 115 advisors will likely result in an increase in the operating costs per advisor. INL personnel told SIGIR that approximately \$500 million is needed to operate at the 115-advisor level. Ambassador Sison briefed me two weeks ago that 100 of the 115 personnel are already on board.

In August 2010, INL received \$450 million for startup costs and \$200 million for FY2011 4th quarter operating costs. According to its spend plan, INL expected to use most of these funds to upgrade hub and aviation facilities and purchase rotary wing aircraft. However, INL has suspended plans to operate dedicated aircraft for the PDP. According to expenditure data from September 2011, approximately \$83 million of the \$450 million remained.

In its FY 2011 Foreign Operations budget justification, State requested an additional \$314.6 million to pay for virtually the same requirements it had requested in its FY 2010 supplemental, namely, "start-up requirements such as facilities upgrades, security infrastructure, and procurement of aircraft, as well as costs associated with recruiting; hiring; training; deploying; and supporting key program, support, and security personnel." INL did not provide SIGIR with its FY 2011 Spending Plan. According to INL officials, the PDP has received \$94.56 million of the \$314.6 million in FY 2011 funding. INL documents received by SIGIR in August 2011 indicated that none of the \$94.56 million FY 2011 funds had been obligated at that time. Based on this data, SIGIR estimates that about \$200 million to \$300 million could be available from FYs 2010 and 2011 funds to pay for FY 2012 program expenses.

State's spend plan for the \$200 million received in the FY 2010 Supplemental (for FY 2011 4th quarter operating costs) shows that only about 12% of these funds were targeted to hire, train, and deploy police advisors and managers. The remaining 88% were for (1) life and mission support for the advisors and staff, (2) security for sites and transportation, and (3) operation and maintenance of the helicopter air wing.

In its FY 2012 budget request to the Congress, State asked for \$887 million to support the PDP. The MOI today conducts its own basic training and functions on an annual budget of \$6.3 billion – which pays for the salaries, equipment, and maintenance for a force of over 650,000. The U.S. program is equivalent to about 15% of the entire MOI budget.

PDP and the Government of Iraq

A cardinal rule for successful international development programs is that the host government must be fully engaged in and supportive of program planning and execution. As SIGIR has found from seven years of oversight work in Iraq, programs must be geared to indigenous priorities, capacities, and needs. In the broader context of the U.S. engagement in Iraq, "detailed joint planning with Iraqi officials, perhaps the most important prerequisite for success after security,

only gradually improved over time.”⁸ This lesson must be fully applied to future execution of the PDP.

Senior officials from Iraq’s Ministry of Interior told SIGIR this fall that they are ready and willing to work with INL on the PDP, but they also noted that the program’s merits are impossible to assess as of yet, that they were not sufficiently consulted on the program’s scope, and that they are withholding judgment until they see what benefits come from it. In an October meeting with my deputy, Senior Deputy Minister of Interior Adnan al Asadi said: “What tangible benefit is there to my ministry of 650,000 people who are in the midst of massive security challenges on the streets of Iraq? Very little.” He modified his tone in his recent meeting with me but raised similar concerns.

SIGIR’s discussions with the senior leadership at the Ministry of Interior make it clear that the GOI views the PDP with some concern. While they are not opposed to receiving the advising and mentoring proposed by the State Department, they also recognize the limitations of any program managed by the U.S. government in Iraq’s current volatile environment. Moreover, Iraqi officials expressed concern that the majority of funds – about 88%, according to our latest audit – will be absorbed by the costs of security, housing, transportation, and logistics.

While the U.S. government views the PDP as about a billion dollar capacity-development program, the Iraqis view it as 115 English-speaking police advisors (25 of whom will be stationed in the stable Kurdistan Region) providing diverse training and support. With those advisors come burdens, including requests from the U.S. Embassy for land use agreements, for visas for third country national security guards, for weapons permits for armed security teams, and the like. The land use issue is significant. The primary PDP location in Baghdad is at Forward Operating Base Shield, which is right in the middle of an unstable area of Baghdad that houses the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Oil, and the Baghdad Police College. The Iraqis expressed concern that the placement of American advisors in that location may attract attacks that could affect nearby facilities.

The PDP is not just as a capacity development program for Iraq’s MOI; it also will serve as an important tool for engagement with senior MOI officials, which will enhance relational continuity and promote the effective flow of information that is crucial to the security of U.S. personnel and facilities across Iraq. This is a valid concern. Whether \$1.2 billion is a fair price to pay to achieve these goals is subject to question.

The State Department has said that the GOI, and specifically, the MOI leadership, strongly support the PDP program. This position is consistent with statements made by the MOI after our audit and latest quarterly report were released; Deputy Minister al Asadi had been engaged by the Embassy on the comments he made to SIGIR about the PDP and which we reported. Effective diplomacy notwithstanding, ensuring authentic “buy-in” by the Iraqis on this, the single largest continuing program in Iraq, is crucial to the program’s long-term success. Moreover, as discussed in our audit, the GOI has not made the financial contribution toward the cost of the

⁸ Hard Lessons, p. 333

PDP as required by our law and policy. Iraq is certainly able to make such a contribution, and its failure to do so raises genuine concerns about its commitment to the program.

Context and Conclusion

During my briefing with Ambassador Michele Sison, I was encouraged by the progress that she has made toward implementing SIGIR's recent recommendations. She only recently took full charge of the PDP, and, since doing so, she has developed reporting mechanisms that should provide a much-needed level of detail on the implementation and effects of the program. Moreover, she is pushing forward the long-needed assessment and assured me that it would soon be complete. Monitoring is key, as our previous reporting on State Department contract management substantiates. Ensuring a sufficient number of in country contracting officer representatives will be crucial to protecting the taxpayers' interests and to the program's ultimate success.

Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be pleased to respond to your questions.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Bowen.

And I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. I had some very probing questions, was really going to put you on the spot here this afternoon. But since you brought your mother, I can get a little more genteel.

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you.

Mr. CHABOT. All kidding aside, we just want to get the appropriate responses out there.

First of all, SIGIR documented in its PDP audit what it believes constitutes continued obstructions to the execution of SIGIR's statutory authority to conduct oversight on the part of DoS. To what do you attribute this resistance?

In the correspondence between DoS and SIGIR, DoS expounded a view that resources and programs which are shared by both the PDP and Embassy Baghdad do not fall under SIGIR's jurisdictions. Do you face some more objections in other audits? Could you address that?

Mr. BOWEN. No, we haven't faced similar objections other than in one prior instance with the State Department regarding an audit we wanted to carry out of Triple Canopy, a major defense security contractor in country. And we withdrew our audit 3½ years ago because the State Department IG announced an audit that was virtually identical. So there was a rational basis for us not pursuing it.

The State Department IG is not auditing the Police Development Program. And the single biggest largest program in the United States is funding next year in Iraq. And, thus, it is crucial for the Congress to know the truth.

Mr. CHABOT. Well, SIGIR on numerous occasions cites plans and documents which were not provided. Do you believe these documents exist and were not provided because of jurisdictional disagreements or, alternatively, do you think that the level of information SIGIR received is reflective of the state of planning which actually exists or existed in the INL? And have there been any further developments since the audit was completed?

Mr. BOWEN. Some of those documents did exist. Yet, I think also some were developed in the face of our requests. Indeed, as we asked for plans and a comprehensive plan about what did the PDP constitute, we received a PowerPoint slide presentation of about 23 slides.

Later, further supplementation was more detailed, but it appeared it had been developed subsequent to our request. On the other hand, we never got the Fiscal Year 2011 spend plan, which certainly existed.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

Mr. Bowen, in your testimony, you observed that "In August 2010, INL received \$450 million for start-up costs and \$200 million for Fiscal Year 2011 fourth quarter operating costs."

According to a spend plan, INL expected to use most of these funds to upgrade hub and aviation facilities and purchase rotary wing aircraft. However, INL has suspended plans to operate dedicated aircraft for the PDP.

If not for INL, what do you believe the money was spent for?

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I believe part of the purposes of the air wing, the State Department's air wing in Iraq was for the movement of the senior officials and others around the country on missions and for DV visits as well.

As you pointed out, that particular aspect of the program was suspended, which raises a question about the 887 million request since it embraces the airway.

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you.

As you note in your testimony,

"A cardinal rule for successful international development programs is that the host government must be fully engaged in and supportive of program planning and execution. As SIGIR has found from 7 years of oversight work in Iraq, programs must be geared to indigenous priorities, capacities, and needs.

"Senior officials from Iraq's Ministry of Interior told SIGIR this fall that they are ready and willing to work with INL on the PDP, but they also noted that the program's merits are impossible to assess as of yet, that they were not sufficiently consulted on the program's scope, and that they are withholding judgment until they see what benefits come from it.

"In an October meeting with my deputy, Senior Deputy Minister of Interior Adnan al-Asadi, said, 'What tangible benefit is there to my ministry of 650,000 people who are in the midst of massive security challenges on the streets of Iraq? Very little.'"

What is your prognosis for Iraqi support, financial or otherwise, for the PDP?

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I think they are not turning their back on \$1 billion. They don't shoot gift horses, do they? They are willing to accept the \$62 billion later. The Iraqis have not said no to any U.S. dollar sent to Iraq to date. And they are not saying no to these.

The issue, though, is, as the committee has already addressed, is this wisely spent? And will it advance a goal that needs to be met that mainly the internal security of Iraq. And while Minister Al-Asadi is welcoming at this juncture of his support, at first blush, when he was first engaged seriously on the topic, he demurred and perhaps spoke off the cuff regarding his, at best, curiosity about why we were spending so much money on an issue.

That President Talibani was addressed 4 days ago in a public statement. He said, "Iraq is capable of providing its own internal security."

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

Gentleman from New York, Ranking Member Ackerman, sir, an extra 5 minutes.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Do these programs ever work?

Mr. BOWEN. They work as best as they can. It depends on defining goals. And you raise a—

Mr. ACKERMAN. I can fly as best I can, too.

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, Mr. Ackerman, your implicit point is well-taken. We did train 450,000 Iraqis to be police across the country. We equipped them. They are better than they were before. But what we uncovered in our audit of a year ago, as DoD managed

this program, we discovered that there weren't sufficient metrics or an over-arching strategic plan to judge whether they worked.

Mr. ACKERMAN. How much did we spend on that? That didn't work.

Mr. BOWEN. \$8 billion.

Mr. ACKERMAN. \$8 billion that didn't work. So what are the lessons we learned?

Mr. BOWEN. Be careful with the taxpayers' money in stabilization operations.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Okay. How do we apply that to the new management so they know how to apply it?

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I don't know the answer to that question, but I would say, as we apply it to this, we should better assess what the Iraqis' real needs are, which is why a year ago, we said, "Do an assessment." Then you can target your aid. The aid is preceding an assessment or, actually, now coincident with.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let me ask a question because I am having difficulty getting my arms around this. How do you assess in the near term whether you are teaching human rights to people who are learning it? How do you evaluate gender rights absent the 20-year sky view look at it?

Mr. BOWEN. Well, Mr. Ackerman, I think you have raised a larger question about assessing development. Those are——

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is a dilemma. How do you measure it?

Mr. BOWEN. I think it is extremely difficult to do, Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. So we don't know if we are making progress toward it either?

Mr. BOWEN. I think that is a fair assessment.

Mr. ACKERMAN. So there is no way to measure it?

Mr. BOWEN. On those two issues, given the long-term nature of such programs, it would be difficult to assess it on a year-to-year basis.

Mr. ACKERMAN. So there is no way to evaluate it. We have no oversight over a program that is costing hundreds of millions of dollars. And it is not going to be able to be demonstrated, even if it is working or not working.

Mr. BOWEN. With regard to gender and human rights, I think that is true. With regard to the 48 other things that they are doing, I think it depends on the particular topic they are undertaking.

For example, one of the programs is, as I was briefed by Ambassador Sison, canine training; in other words, providing them bomb-sniffing dogs, which also has been going on. The military did do that for years already. So there are some ground-level aspects of this program as well as higher-level.

Mr. ACKERMAN. What do we have the best chance of accurately measuring, evaluating in all of the goals of the program?

Mr. BOWEN. I think it is inherently difficult to measure mentoring, but the best, the most measurable aspects of this program are those that are subject to more objective analysis, like how many canine dogs have you provided and training to trainers who can use them in bomb-sniffing situations?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let's say the answer is 106. Is that a good result?

Mr. BOWEN. That is why you have to set goals ahead of time. And that was one of our criticisms about the program. They didn't set goals.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Are they setting goals now?

Mr. BOWEN. That is what I have been told.

Mr. ACKERMAN. How many bomb-sniffing dogs do they need to be successful?

Mr. BOWEN. They haven't told me that.

Mr. ACKERMAN. How many women in general do they need to be successful?

Mr. BOWEN. We are going to follow up in the spring with another audit to look at the effects and results of the changes made by the Department in implementing our recommendations. And I can better answer those questions then.

Mr. ACKERMAN. They don't have these metrics in place now?

Mr. BOWEN. I have been told that they are putting them in. This was a core criticism of the audit, the absence of milestones and metrics. That was our second finding, really. And they said that they are doing that. We haven't gone back in to review the success of implementing those changes yet.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I used to be a school teacher. I knew if a kid got between 60 and 65, he was going to get a D and knew what the numbers were to give him an F and where I was going to give him an A. Do they have such a chart?

Mr. BOWEN. Not that I am aware of. They didn't when we did the audit.

Mr. ACKERMAN. So they have not said anything?

Mr. BOWEN. No metrics, no milestones.

Mr. ACKERMAN. No metrics, no milestones, no money. That is my point of view.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman.

Good afternoon, Mr. Bowen, Mr. Furbish. Thank you for being here.

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you.

Mr. MARINO. I believe both of you gentlemen were in the audience when I was questioning the Secretary Darby about missing funds. This may not be directly on point, but it goes to the credibility of the prime minister and his government and it goes to accounting for our tax dollars. So perhaps you can help me with something.

I am going to read you something that I found early on. In October in a USA Today article, it was reported that there was \$217 million in cash that was stored in a palace that is still unaccounted for in Baghdad. There is an additional \$1.6 billion that was intended for distribution among the regions in Iraq that is unaccounted for. And that was part of a \$2.4 billion deposit to the Baghdad government.

Also, other information that has come to my attention is that one, if not many more, of the government officials have just merely walked away with millions of dollars. And the government has introduced past legislation laws saying that any government official

is immune from prosecution for accounting for any of this money. No one has been held responsible for it. And is this information accurate?

Mr. BOWEN. With regard to the amnesty law of 2008 that the Council of Representatives passed, yes. Senior government officials in Iraq, Iraqi officials told me that that essentially wiped the slate clean for fraud committed prior to that date.

Regarding the development fund for Iraq issues, which you raised, we did issue a new audit on that issue, our third that identified and raised new questions, identified some answers but raised new questions about the U.S. use of Iraqi dollars.

And, Glenn, why don't you address what our next audit is going to hit regarding the \$217 million and the \$2.8 billion?

Mr. MARINO. Can you do that rather succinctly? I am limited here to about 2½ minutes.

Mr. FURBISH. Very quickly, we are looking right now at how the U.S. used that money. That money was used by the Corps of Engineers to carrying out projects in Iraq. And we are looking at their records to account for that money. We will be reporting on that within the next 2 months.

Mr. MARINO. Perhaps we should ask the prime minister if he wants to keep these programs in effect over there to account for the money that has been missing. There is no indication at this point. And perhaps you can help me with this rhetorical statement that there have been no plans for Iraq to pass back anything that we have spent over there. We will never recoup from the lives that we lost over there.

How can we continue to—I will use this term loosely—do business with a government that has proven to be corrupt, has proven to have very little concern for their overall population? How can I justify to my people in the Tenth Congressional District of north central Pennsylvania that we are going to spend billions of dollars more in this Iraqi Government and my people are losing their jobs?

If I hear of one more time of a foreign despot leaving or living a life of luxury on billions of dollars of taxpayer money, I want to be in charge of the team that goes over there to apprehend them and bring them back.

Mr. BOWEN. Mr. Marino, corruption is and has been a devastating problem in Iraq and has inhibited progress across the board on the relief and reconstruction front. More importantly, it inhibits progress for the average Iraqi. They are going to have a budget next year of over \$110 billion. But the corruption issue, you know, raises real questions about the proper use of that money.

Mr. MARINO. But if I might interrupt you, how are you going to measure whether we are making any improvements on curtailing corruption over there?

Mr. BOWEN. It is difficult to do because it occurs in the shadow. However, let me identify one important step that we have been calling for for years and did occur this year. And that was the repeal of an article in their criminal code that allowed any minister to absolve any employee from any liability for fraud. That is obvious counter to the basic notions of democracy. They finally did it. And so I commend them on it.

But the reality is, is having laws on the books like that failing to have a Commission on Integrity that does its job, failing to have a judiciary that will convict people for corruption is why Iraq is in the bottom five in the world in transparency international's index.

Mr. MARINO. Well, at this point I am not convinced to support any legislation that would send any more money over to Iraq. And I see my time is up, but I thank you gentlemen for the work that you have been doing and that you will continue to do.

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Mr. Marino.

Mr. MARINO. I yield back.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bowen, you had indicated that you had been in Iraq 33 times?

Mr. BOWEN. 31.

Mr. HIGGINS. 31. Dating back to?

Mr. BOWEN. February 2004.

Mr. HIGGINS. 2004. Your last trip was?

Mr. BOWEN. 2 weeks ago.

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. The effort starting in 2003 was to commit \$8 billion to train the Iraqi police force some 450,000 Iraqis. Since there are no baseline assessments, again I would ask you, as I asked the previous witness, anecdotally what is your sense of the security system, the internal security system, with respect to Iraq, where the holes are? Are there any places like in Baghdad, for example, or Ramadi that provide a good example of a successful result from this financial effort?

Mr. BOWEN. I think there have been examples of success across the country. Anbar Province is much safer than it was 6 years ago. Kurdistan, the three northern provinces, are largely very well in order.

Mr. HIGGINS. But they were pretty calm to begin with.

Mr. BOWEN. You're right. There are two Iraqs. There is Kurdistan and the southern 15. But, really, what you are addressing is the current state of the Iraqi rule of law system as a whole. And that embraces corrections, the judiciary, and the police.

And I think that there continue to be serious problems on all fronts, not just police training. The judiciary, over 45 judges have been killed in the last 7 years. I met with Judge Medhat during my trip. And another judge had just been killed. And he was bemoaning again the lack of weapons cards for his judge's security members.

And then on the prison front, you know, frankly, we invested a lot of money building prisons and we wasted a lot of money.

Mr. HIGGINS. Sadr City, five million population center of Baghdad. How does the Iraqi Government deal with Sadr City, just stay out of there altogether?

Mr. BOWEN. I think it is a truce of sorts between the Sadrist, who control that area, and the rest of Baghdad. And I think that is why, frankly, Mr. Maliki's senior Deputy Minister, Al-Asadi, and others are concerned that the primary location for the Police Development Program in Iraq is right on the edge of Sadr City. It is di-

rectly next to the Baghdad Police College, another place where we wasted a lot of money, across the street from the Minister of Interior and adjacent to Sadr City and, thus, a magnet for indirect fire.

Mr. HIGGINS. Clearly there is a lack of oversight and transparency. And that problem is seemingly pervasive and growing or at least since we have initiated this back in 2003.

Why is it that the State Department would deliberately make efforts to obstruct efforts to bring greater oversight and transparency? Why is there that adversarial relationship? It would seem to me that your efforts would be to benefit the effective use, efficient use of American resources in that region because we all have a strategic interest in seeing that region evolve. Why is it that you suspect that the State Department is seemingly obstructing those efforts?

Mr. BOWEN. Well, it was obstructing. I think we heard today that they are supportive, almost fully supportive, of our oversight at this stage. And it took an obstruction letter, though, Mr. Higgins, as you were pointing to to break that logjam.

Why? You know, I can't read into the exact motives, but I think, to a certain extent, it was a legalistic argument about jurisdiction.

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. Okay. Just, you know, a final thought on this. You know, someone said, I think it was Tom Friedman. He posed a question. He said, "Is Iraq the way it is because Saddam was the way he is or is Saddam the way he is because Iraq is the way it is?"

I just think when you look at this long, expensive effort—and I don't just mean financial expense, expense in human capital—in the surge experience, again, which was to tamp down the violence, to provide a breathing space, within which all of the political factions in Iraq could reconcile their differences and evolve.

It seems as though, you know the surge succeeded militarily. But politically the situation doesn't seem to evolve. And obviously the policing issue, as I mentioned previously, in northern Ireland is fundamental to the success of any kind of power-sharing agreement.

And without meaningful progress over the past 8 years in this renewed effort, given this horrible past of wasted money, of great expectations and lofty goals but very, very little to show for it, it seems as though, you know, a \$1 billion expenditure over the next 5 years moving forward is not a good use of American resources in a region that I think we have done everything that we can do in order to help them achieve their objectives, whatever they are, be they consistent with our objectives or not.

So I yield back.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes and will be our final questioner this afternoon.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome both to Mr. Furbish and Mr. Bowen. General Bowen, I am sure your mother is proud of your performance today and your service to your country. Thirty-one trips to Iraq, that deserves a special status. I, in fact, traveled with you on one of those 31 trips. And I can vouch for the fact that you get your hands dirty in trying to understand what is going on.

Let me pick up where my colleague Mr. Higgins sort of led us, which is you said that you issued to the State Department a letter of obstruction. Is that right?

Mr. BOWEN. That is right.

Mr. CONNOLLY. How often do letters of obstruction get issued from inspector generals?

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I explored that question after we issued it. And my staff tells me that, at least over the last 4 years, ours was the only one.

Mr. CONNOLLY. So on relatively unprecedented ground.

Mr. BOWEN. Yes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. But you heard the first witness in the first panel reassure us up and down that she was mostly kind of fully committed to full transparency or transparency and accountability. I assume a letter of obstruction would, sadly, contradict such an assertion.

Mr. BOWEN. Well, Mr. Connolly, it actually worked in this case. We received virtually no documents before August 3rd, the date of the letter. And afterwards we got enough to do the audit. We didn't get everything we asked for, but vis-à-vis what we had in June and July, it was a world of difference.

Mr. CONNOLLY. If I understood your answer to Mr. Higgins' questioning, you attributed this to just turf protection, bureaucratic turf protection.

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir. I think that is true.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, you know, taxpayer money is on the line here. Did you not sense any commitment from the Department of State and its officials to joining you in trying to make sure that we were protecting this \$1 billion investment of U.S. taxpayer money?

Mr. BOWEN. I sensed it today.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Today? I heard you respond to my colleague Mr. Ackerman in a declarative sentence, "There are no metrics and no milestones with respect to the PDP." Is that correct?

Mr. BOWEN. There weren't when we carried out our audit. They are remedying that issue now.

Mr. CONNOLLY. But you don't know what they are?

Mr. BOWEN. Not yet.

Mr. CONNOLLY. It would strike, I think, the average American, if not the average Member of Congress to invest \$1 billion in anything absent metrics and milestones is a fool's herring, whatever the intention, however noble the motivation. If you can't measure it, it is not real as far as I am concerned. Is that a view shared by you, Mr. Bowen?

Mr. BOWEN. That is my judgment. I have said that if you don't show the Congress good metrics and good milestones and identify what your goals are, it is tough to ask for more money.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. I think most of us would maybe feel we shouldn't, not only more money. We shouldn't spend a dime, frankly, without some rigorous metrics and milestones that are efficacious, that are meaningful.

The object here is to train a viable police force that has some respect for law that isn't corrupt, that can win the confidence of the people and, frankly, enter into the space we create when we withdraw. Is that not true?

Mr. BOWEN. I think that is exactly right, Mr. Connolly. And we spent, as I said, \$8 billion already. This is a 5-year program with, you know, several hundred million, actually \$400 million, already spent on this part of it. Are we going to spend \$2-, \$3-, \$4 billion more to do what when President Talibani said 4 days ago or 5?

Mr. CONNOLLY. To what did you attribute—you cited in your report, I believe, this quote I read the previous witness from the senior Deputy Minister of Interior Adnan Al-Asadi, who I think referred to the PDP as a hopeless waste of money, your money, American money. Is that true?

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. That was his early October interview with my deputy, Ginger Cruz. And I met with him 2½ weeks ago. He moderated his tone a little bit, but when I pressed him more firmly, he said, “Well, it is still on”——

Mr. CONNOLLY. “Still on my Web site”?

Mr. BOWEN. That is right.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Now, you heard the previous witness attempt, I think, to deflect that statement and argue that while our understanding is now that he is on board and he supports the program, they are still certainly making the request for the funding of the program. And she again I think sort of deflected my question about “Well, is that a representative view of senior officials over in Iraq or was that sort of an outlier point of view or a rare moment of candor?”

You might want to comment. My time is up.

Mr. BOWEN. Well, he was the only senior official from the Ministry of Interior to whom I addressed that issue. And the core point is he did not step too far away from it in our discussions.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Did you want to follow up?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say thank you to you for holding this hearing. I think this hearing has raised really serious questions about this program. And whatever our intentions are, Lord knows we do need a well-trained police force in Iraq.

I don’t leave this hearing with any confidence that the program in front of us with \$1 billion being planned in expenditures over the next several years has the slightest chance of being effective. And I think that raises real questions about how we proceed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. And I would like to thank the members of the panel, both up here, for their participation and probing questions this afternoon, the panel, both panels here this afternoon. Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks.

And, if there is no further business to come before the committee, we are adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
Steve Chabot (R-OH), Chairman

November 29, 2011

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building **(and available live, via the WEBCAST link on the Committee website at <http://www.hcfa.house.gov>)**:

DATE: Wednesday, November 30, 2011

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Preserving Progress in Iraq, Part III: Iraq's Police Development Program

WITNESS: Panel I
Ms. Brooke Darby
Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
U.S. Department of State

Panel II
Mr. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.
Inspector General
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

Mr. Glenn D. Furbish
Assistant Inspector General for Audits
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON MESA HEARINGDay Wed Date Nov 30th Room 2170Starting Time 1:05 Ending Time 2:40Recesses ☐ (to) (to) (to) (to) (to) (to)

Presiding Member(s)

Chabot

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session ☒Electronically Recorded (taped) ☐Executive (closed) Session ☐Stenographic Record ☒Televised ☒

TITLE OF HEARING:

Iraq: Police Development Program

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Chabot, Ackerman, Marina, Higgins, Rehrbach, Turner
Reading

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes ☒ No ☐
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 2:40 PM[Signature]
Subcommittee Staff Director